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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§78-2a-2(3)G)(1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants/Appellees Jesse and Betty Christensen are dissatisfied with 
Plaintiff/Appellant Dorann Mitchell's statement of the issue presented in her brief, and therefore 
submit the following statement of the issues and applicable standard of review: 
Issues: 
1. Whether Defendants had a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiff the existence of 
alleged leaks in their swimming pool prior to the sale of their property to Plaintiff. 
2. Whether the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to this case. 
Standard of Review: A challenge of a Summary Judgment presents only questions of law 
which are reviewed for correctness. Eastmond v. EarL 912 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC, 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Dorann Mitchell ("Plaintiff) appeals from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court Judge Dennis M. Fuchs granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants/Appellees Jesse and Betty Christensen ("Defendants"). 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about September 25, 1995, Plaintiff purchased a home from Defendants 
located at 2820 East Robidoux Road, Sandy, Utah (the "Property"), which included a backyard 
swimming pool. (R. 51). 
2. In connection with the sale of the Property, Plaintiff and Defendants executed a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract"). (R. 52). 
3. The Purchase Contract gave Plaintiff the right to conduct an inspection of the 
Property herself and to hire one or more professional inspectors to inspect the Property. (R. 52). 
4. Plaintiff inspected the Property herself and hired a professional inspector, 
AmeriSpec-Salt Lake ("Amerispec"), to inspect the Property. (R. 52). 
5. Plaintiffs access to the Property to conduct inspections was never restricted or 
prohibited. (R. 52-53). 
6. AmeriSpec completed an inspection of the Property and provided Plaintiff with an 
inspection report (the "Inspection Report"). (R. 89-107). 
7. AmeriSpec found the pool area and equipment covered by the inspection to be in 
working order; however, AmericSpec's inspection of the pool was limited in scope. (R. 107). 
8. With regard to the pool, the Inspection Report stated: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. It is an operational 
inspection of the accessible equipment and components and is therefore limited in 
scope. If concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company perform an 
in-depth review and/or service, (emphasis added). (R. 107). 
9. Prior to closing on the purchase of the Property, Plaintiff did not have a licensed 
pool company (or anyone else) perform an in-depth review of the pool. (R. 54). 
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10. Sometime after Plaintiff s purchase of the Property, Plaintiff discovered 
substantial leaks in the pool. (R. 54). 
11. Had the Plaintiff hired a licensed pool company to perform an in-depth review, 
any leaks existing at the time of sale would have been revealed. (R. 108-109). 
12. Defendants were unaware of the existence of any leaks in the pool as of the date 
of the sale of the Property. (R. 81, 84). 
13. Plaintiff never asked Defendants whether the pool leaked, and Defendants never 
represented to Plaintiff that the pool did not leak, although Defendants believed that it did not. 
(R. 72,81,84). 
14. Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action against Defendants on July 30, 1997. 
(R. 1-3). Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, filed on December 9, 1997, alleges that at the 
time of the sale of the Property the swimming pool was leaking, Defendants knew of the 
existence of the alleged leaks, and Defendants had a duty to disclose the existence of the leaks to 
Plaintiff prior to selling the Property. (R. 32-33). 
15. Defendants deny Plaintiffs allegations that the pool leaked on or before the sale 
of the Property closed and that Defendants were aware of any leaks; however, for the purposes of 
summary judgment Defendants asked the court to assume that they were, in fact, aware of leaks 
in the pool at the time of sale of the Property. (R. 135). 
16. Defendants moved for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff on the grounds that 
even if Defendants had been aware of the existence of leaks in the swimming pool, Defendants 
did not have a legal duty to disclose these defects and the doctrine of caveat emptor applied 
precluding Plaintiffs action. (R. 51-62). 
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17. On March 18, 1999, the trial court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 151). Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on April 12, 1999. (R. 152-153). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' failure to disclose alleged leaks in the swimming pool 
prior to the sale of the Property gives Plaintiff a cause of action against Defendants for fraudulent 
nondisclosure. A necessary element of the fraudulent nondisclosure cause of action is that the 
person being charged had a legal duty to communicate the undisclosed information. Between a 
seller and purchaser of used housing, such a duty exists only if the defect is "not discoverable by 
reasonable care." In applying this standard, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that if an 
inspection of the defective premises would have revealed the claimed defect, failure to obtain 
such an inspection is unreasonable. 
In this case, Plaintiff failed to obtain an inspection of the pool by a licensed pool 
company. It is undisputed by the parties that if Plaintiff had obtained an inspection of the pool by 
a licensed pool company, the inspection would have revealed the alleged leaks in the pool. 
Although Plaintiff hired an inspection company to provide a genreal inspection of the Property, 
the Inspection Report expressly stated that, regarding the pool, it was an operation inspection of 
the accessable equipment and components only. The Inspection Report made it clear that the 
inspection was limited in scope and excluded the below surface area of the pool. In effect, 
Plaintiff did not request or obtain an inspection of the below surface area of the pool which 
inspection would have revealed any leaks. Because an inspection of the sub-surface area of the 
pool would have revealed the alleged leaks, such leaks would have been discoverable by Plaintiff 
upon the exercise of reasonable care. 
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Furthermore, in the Inspection Report, Plaintiff was specifically advised to hire a licensed 
pool company. By choosing not do so, and by choosing not to obtain any express written 
warranties from Defendants or to make any inquires as to whether the pool leaked, Plaintiff 
accepted the risk that the pool had latent defects. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law, 
Defendants did not have a legal duty to disclose the existence of the alleged leaks. Because the 
requirements have not been met for a cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure, the doctrine of 
caveat emptor (buyer beware) applies and precludes Plaintiffs recovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A LEGAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE ALLEGED 
LEAKS IN THE POOL. 
Plaintiffs claim against Defendants is for fraudulent nondisclosure of leaks in the 
swimming pool allegedly existing at the time of Defendants' sale of the Property to Plaintiff.1 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "in order to be held liable for fraudulent nondisclosure, 
there must have been a duty to disclose, the burden of establishing which is on the party alleging 
the fraud and the determination of which is a question of law for the court to decide." First Sec. 
Bank v. Banberrv Dev., 786 P.2d 1326, 1328-29 (Utah 1990). The circumstances in this case did 
not give rise to a legal duty to disclose the alleged existence of leaks in the swimming pool. 
Under Utah law, "the duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction exists only where a 
defect is not discoverable by reasonable care." Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc.. 875 
1
 Plaintiff alleges "fraudulent nondisclosure/concealment" as its cause of action. Other 
than to make an unsupported statement implying that Defendants actively concealed the 
existence of leaks, fraudulent nondisclosure, not fraudulent concealment appears to be the basis 
for this action. In any case, the requirements for fraudulent nondisclosure and for fraudulent 
concealment are similar. 
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P.2d 570, 579 (Utah App. 1994). In Maack the purchasers of a used home sued sellers for latent 
defects discovered in the home's stucco. The sellers were aware of the defects but did not 
disclose them to the purchasers and purchasers did not obtain an inspection of the home prior to 
sale. The Maack Court held that, despite the seller's knowledge of the defects, the purchasers' 
failure to obtain an inspection was unreasonable because such an inspection would have revealed 
the claimed defects. See, id. at 875 P.2d at 879 n.8. According to Maack, it is unreasonable not 
to obtain an inspection when such an inspection would reveal the claimed defects; in other 
words, there is no duty to disclose defects that would have been discovered upon a reasonable 
inspection.2 
A. Inspection of the Above Ground Area of the Pool Does Not Constitute 
Reasonable Care With Respect to the Below Ground Area of the Pool. 
It is undisputed by the parties that had Plaintiff obtained an inspection of the pool by a 
licensed pool company, any leaks in the swimming pool existing at the time of inspection would 
have been revealed. Plaintiffs position is that because she obtained a general inspection of the 
Property by a professional inspection company, AmeriSpec, she was not required to obtain an 
additional inspection of the swimming pool by a licensed pool company. AmeriSpec's 
inspection, however, was expressly limited in scope. With regard to the pool, AmeriSpec's 
2
 Addressing the issue of fraudulent nondisclosure, the Maack Court stated that its 
holding that the seller did not have a legal duty to disclose defects in the home's stucco was a 
"close call." Plaintiff incorrectly states that the Maack Court's holding was a close call because 
the defective stucco was aesthetically pleasing. Rather, the decision was a close call because the 
seller had affirmatively disclosed the existence of some defects in the stucco so that seller's 
partial disclosure of the defective stucco may have mislead the purchasers into believing that no 
other defects existed. See, Maack, 875 P.2d at 878-79. This case does not present the same 
"close call." Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants ever revealed any facts that could have 
mislead the Plaintiff into believing that the pool did not leak. 
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Inspection Report states that: "Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. It is 
an operational inspection of the accessible equipment and components and is therefore limited in 
scope." With respect to the items covered by AmeriSpec's Inspection Report, Plaintiff satisfied 
her duty of reasonable care. Plaintiff cannot claim, however, that she exercised reasonable care 
with respect to items specifically excluded from the scope of the inspection.3 
Reasonable care, as set forth in Maack, required Plaintiff to obtain an inspection of the 
items not covered by AmeriSpec's inspection. This is not a "heightened duty" as Plaintiff 
claims. Plaintiff is not being asked to inspect the pool twice; AmericSpec's inspection simply 
did not include an inspection of the below surface area of the pool. Because an inspection of the 
pool by a licensed pool company would have revealed any leaks, it cannot be said that the leaks 
were "not discoverable by reasonable care." 
The rule of law recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals in Maack makes perfect sense. 
A buyer has a responsibility to exercise reasonable care to discover any defects in the home the 
buyer is purchasing. A buyer can decide the extent to which he will inspect the property. A 
buyer could choose not to even look at the property, or could choose to have all aspects of the 
property inspected. It is the buyer's choice; the buyer decides the level of risk that is acceptable 
to him. The seller is not a guarantor of all aspects of the home (if a buyer negotiates for, and 
obtains a homeowner's warranty from the seller, then of course, the result would be different). 
Where no special warranty is obtained by the seller, the buyer must exercise reasonable care to 
discover any defects. 
3
 This argument is the equivalent of claiming that hiring a professional inspector to 
inspect the roof of a premises thereby discharges the purchaser from having to obtain an 
inspection of the walls or foundation of such premises. 
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B. Plaintiff Knowingly Accepted the Risk That the Pool Leaked. 
Plaintiff was advised of the limits of AmeriSpec's inspection. Plaintiff was also 
expressly advised by AmeriSpec that a more thorough inspection of the swimming pool would be 
necessary to reveal any below surface defects. The Inspection Report states that: "If concerned, 
client is advised to have a licensed pool company perform an in-depth review and/or service." 
Plaintiffs claim that she was not concerned about the existence of leaks in the pool is not 
supportive of Plaintiffs claim that she acted reasonably. Whether a pool leaks is a fundamental 
question that reasonable buyer would have been concerned about (just as a reasonable buyer 
would be concerned about whether there were cracks in a home's foundation). Plaintiff claims 
that she had no reason to be concerned because the leaks were not visible and AmeriSpec's 
inspection did not reveal any leaks. Plaintiff cannot hide behind the AmeriSpec inspection, 
however, because AmeriSpec expressly told Plaintiff that its inspection of the pool was limited in 
scope, and that it was an operational inspection of the accessible equipment and components and 
was limited to above ground or visible items only. AmeriSpec did not purport to have inspected 
whether the pool leaked. Since the leaks were below ground, the fact that Plaintiff could not see 
the alleged leaks or that AmeriSpec's above ground inspection did not reveal any leaks should 
not have given Plaintiff any assurances that the pool did not leak. 
By choosing not to obtain an inspection by a licensed pool company as advised to do in 
AmeriSpec's Inspection Report, Plaintiff accepted the risk that there were unknown defects in 
the pool. Plaintiff cannot knowingly accept this risk, and then hold Defendants liable for fraud 
for the consequences of Plaintiff s conscious decision. 
8 
Plaintiff did not hire a licensed pool company nor did Plaintiff seek any express 
warranties from Defendants, in fact, Plaintiff made no inquiries whatsoever, either to Defendants 
or to AmeriSpec, with regard to whether the pool leaked. Because Plaintiff failed to exercise 
reasonable care with regard to the sub-surface area of the pool, Plaintiff has failed to meet her 
burden of establishing that Defendants had a legal duty to disclose the existence of the alleged 
leaks. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
Defendants and against Plaintiff for fraudulent nondisclosure. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES IN THIS CASE. 
Having failed to state a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, caveat emptor applies 
precluding Plaintiff from recovering from Defendants. Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, "the 
vendee is required to make his own inspection of the premises, and the vendor is not responsible 
to him for their defective condition existing at the time of transfer." Loveland v. Orem City 
Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 n.19 (Utah 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts. § 352, 
comment a (1965)). 
The doctrine of caveat emptor clearly applies to the sale of used housing. Recognizing 
the vitality of this doctrine in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court explained that: 
The clear majority of the courts have deemed it reasonable to hold the purchasers 
to the caveat emptor doctrine in the purchase of used housing. The parties know 
the article is not new, and the buyer who has an opportunity to inspect the article 
is placed on the alert for defects which might affect the article's quality, condition 
or fitness. Utah State Med. Ass'n v. Utah State, 655 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982). 
That the doctrine of caveat emptor applies even when defects are latent was confirmed 
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah 1987) 
(determining that purchasers' claim that caveat emptor did not apply to latent defects was an 
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alternative method of arguing for an implied warranty of habitability which is not recognized in 
the sale of used housing in Utah). The Schafir Court held that: 
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties . . . the doctrine of 
caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from bringing suit for discoverable defects 
in the home. Especially when the sale of a used home is involved, the purchaser 
is on notice that the residence is not new and may contain defects affecting the 
home's quality or condition. Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 n.12. 
The facts of this case make application of the doctrine of caveat emptor particularly 
appropriate. Plaintiff was not only aware that the pool was not new but, AmeriSpec specifically 
alerted Plaintiff to the fact that an inspection by a licensed pool company would be necessary to 
uncover below ground defects. Plaintiff could have protected herself by obtaining a more 
thorough inspection of the swimming pool as AmeriSpec's Inspection Report advised or, 
Plaintiff could have sought an express written warranty from Defendants. Having failed to do 
either, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies and bars Plaintiffs recovery against Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that Summary Judgment in 
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff be affirmed. 
DATED: November 15,1999. CALLISTER NEBHKJER & MCCULLOUGH 
By:. 
GEORGE E.«ARRIS, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Jesse and Betty Christensen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREWITH CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF were caused to be served via U.S. first-class mail, postage pre-paid, this |S^Wday of 
November, 1999. 
Scott B. Mitchell 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
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